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Greg French* The Doctrine of Lost Modern Grant and
Prescriptive Easements in Newfoundland
This article examines the history and development of prescriptive easements in
Newfoundland and Labrador and the legal standards required to find such an
easement to exist. The article concludes that the appropriate inquiry is not merely
an examination of the length of use, but also the nature and extent of use, and that
rigid application of timelines should not apply.
L'auteur examine les origines et le ddveloppement des servitudes acquises
par prescription a Terre-Neuve-et-Labrador ainsi que les normes juridiques
ndcessaires pour conclure qu'une telle servitude existe. 11 conclut que la
recherche appropride ne doit pas se limiter a un simple examen de la durde
d'utilisation, mais qu'elle doit aussi porter sur la nature et la portde de l'utilisation
et que I'application rigide des ddlais ne devrait pas s'appliquer
* Associate lawyer at Mills, Pittman and Twyne in Clarenville, NL.
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Introduction
The legal concept of an easement is well known to anyone who has studied
property law: a non-possessory right of use of land, benefitting one parcel
of land (the dominant tenement) with a right of use of another parcel of
land (the servient tenement). The owner of the dominant tenement who
acquires such right does not become the owner of the servient land, but
nevertheless maintains an interest in the use of the servient land. It is an
incorporeal right-an intangible right that does not convey an ownership
interest.' Accordingly, it does not require such stringent use as the open,
notorious, continuous and exclusive use demanded to obtain an ownership
interest in property by adverse possession.2 Easements by prescription are
those that are obtained through adverse use, in much the same way as
adverse possession establishes title.
The seminal Newfoundland case on establishing a prescriptive
easement is Henley v. Ryan.3 This case involved a dispute relating to
the use of a common parking area between two homes in St. John's. In
determining whether or not such a prescriptive right arose, Steele C.J.D.C.
canvassed thoroughly the texts on the law of real property to provide a
thorough analysis of the law on prescriptive easements, which is still
relied on today.'
Henley establishes the rules for establishing a prescriptive easement.
Such use must be nec vi (without violence), nec clam (not secretly), and nec
1. See Blacks Law Dictionary, 8th ed, sub verbo "hereditament, incorporeal"; Dictionary of
Canadian Law, 3rd ed, sub verbo "incorporeal hereditament." Cfdefinition of "corporeal hereditament"
as "a material object in contrast to a right," and refers to tangible items and property capable of
possession in Dictionary of Canadian Law, supra at 276.
2. Bruce Ziff, Principles ofProperty Law, 3rd ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2000) at 353.
3. (1980), 25 Nfid & PEIR 431 (DC) [Henley], per Steele CJDC, as he was then.
4. See Bussey v Maher, 2006 NLCA 44, 256 Nfid & PEIR 308; Skiffington v Linthorne, 2014
NLTD(G) 103, 374 Nfid & PEIR 10; Cooper v Dawe, 2015 NLTD(G) 15, 364 Nfid & PEIR 336.
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precario (without permission). Such use should be distinguished from the
more onerous standards for establishing an ownership interest in land by
adverse possession-possession that is open, notorious, continuous and
exclusive6 . A simple point of contrast is exclusivity-ownership requires
exclusion of the true owner; an easement simply requires non-permitted
use, or as discussed in other case law, "continuous acts of trespass." 7 While
adverse possession is said to be a collection of intense and frequent acts
of trespass, lesser trespass without exclusivity gives nse to a prescnptive
easement. It is not ownership, but a right of use that arises.
In determining whether or not a prescriptive easement is established,
Steele C.J.D.C. identified three legal methods by which prescriptive rights
can be obtained:
1) Pursuant to a prescriptive statute;
2) Claim based on "lost grants"; and
3) Prescription at common law.'
Unlike most other provinces, Newfoundland had no prescniptive statute,
neither at the time of Henley, nor at the time of writing. The date of
reception of English law in Newfoundland has long been established to
be 26 July 1832.9 The first legislation of England to address prescriptive
easements was the Prescription Act, 1832, which passed on 1 August
1832.10 By the separation of five days, the Prescription Act, 1832 was not
received into Newfoundland law. The first method thus had no application.
There is some lack of clarity in Henley in distinguishing between
the latter two methods, and the two appear almost conflated as one. A
"lost grant" claim is premised on the maxim "omnia praesumuntur rite
et sollemniter esse acta"-such peaceably enjoyed use is presumed to
have its basis in lawful origin." What is omitted in Henley is the root of
5. Supra note 3.
6. The contrast between establishing a prescriptive easement versus establishing adverse possession
is discussed at length in Bussey v Maher, supra note 4, and Fowler vAtlantic Developments Inc, 2013
NLCA 58, 342 Nfid & PEIR 189.
7. Re Ellis, [1997] NJ No 211, at paras 163-164, 154 Nfid & PEIR 271.
8. Henley, supra note 3 at para 25.
9. See Buyer's Furniture Ltd v Barney s Sales and Transport Ltd (1983), 43 Nfid & PEIR 158, 27
APR 158 (CA); Roy v LegalAid Commission (Nfld) (1994), 116 Nfid & PEIR 232, 363 APR 232 (TD);
Babstock v Atlantic Lottery Corporation Inc, 2014 NLTD(G) 114, at para 83, 1108 APR 293. This
marks the date of the establishment of the colonial legislature in Newfoundland, and thus the date at
which Newfoundland was able to legislate independently: see Young v Blaikie (1822), 1 Nfid LR 277,
as to discussion of the principle (a case which predates reception).
10. (1832) 2 & 3 Will IV, c 71. The date of enactment is noted on the UK Government's legislation
website, online: <www.legislation.gov.uk>.
11. Henley, supra note 3 at para 29, citing Chesire s Modern Law ofReal Property, 12th ed (London,
UK: Butterworth& Co, 1976) at 538-540.
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"common law prescription," which rests on use since time immemorial.
Under the strictures of law, the phrase "time immemorial" is not merely
a poetic turn of phrase for long forgotten use; it is a term of art with a
particular legal meaning. Specifically, it refers to the date of "legal
memory," which is established by statute as beginning in A.D. 1189 with
the commencement of the reign of Richard I.12 Indeed, the purpose of the
passage of England's Prescription Act, 1832 was precisely to avoid the
strictures of prescription at common law, which, by the date of passage
of such legislation, would have required tracing the use of an easement
back for almost 650 years.1 3 Accordingly, since no use in Newfoundland
can be traced back to the origin of legal memory in A.D. 1189, common
law prescription is unavailable in this province." As noted above,
Newfoundland did not receive the Prescription Act, 1832, and it does not
form part of the law of that province. Thus, its amendment to the legal
definition of "time immemorial" was neither received from England nor
adopted by domestic enactment. Prescription at common law thus does
not exist there. As confirmed by the Newfoundland and Labrador Court
of Appeal, the only method by which a prescriptive easement can be
established is through the doctrine of lost modem grant."
I. The twenty-year period
In the provinces where prescriptive easements still exist, many provinces
have simply opted for a legislative solution through the passage of their
own version of the English Prescription Act, 1832 or incorporation of
the terms of the Act into limitations legislation. 1 6 Case law from other
jurisdictions thus finds its roots in the Prescription Act, 1832 or its domestic
progeny, which set a strict twenty-year threshold for the establishment of a
prescriptive easement.
The origin of the twenty-year standard of measurement for
determination of a lost modem grant finds its roots in old English case
12. See the preamble to the Prescription Act, 1832, supra note 10. The commencement of the reign
of Richard I as the date of legal memory was statutorily set: see the Statute of Westminster (1285) 3
Edw I, c 39.
13. Ibid, at the preamble.
14. Franklin v St John s (City) 2012 NLCA 48, 325 Nfid & PEIR 38, atparas 33-34 (CA) [Franklin].
Note that this decision confirms the applicability of the Statute of Westminster's commencement of
"time immemorial" at AD 1189.
15. Ibid, at para 34.
16. See Easements Act, RSNB 2011, c 143; Limitations ofActions Act, RSNS 1989, c 258, s 32;
Real Property Limitations Act, RSO 1990, c L-15, s 31. Manitoba inherited the Prescription Act, 1832
by virtue of its date of reception in 1870, and no legislative alternative has been made: see Bank of
Montreal v Superior Management Ltd, 2010 MBQB 244 atparas 32-33, [2010] MJ No 337 and cases
cited therein. The remaining provinces, apart from PEI, have statutorily abolished prescription.
The Doctrine of Lost Modern Grant and Prescriptive 589
Easements in Newfoundland
law." Prior to the passage of the Prescription Act, 1832, the twenty-year
rule arose as a jury charge: a jury was permitted to find an easement's
origin in a grant if use was established for twenty years." This was not a
question of looking for an actual deed, but a mere licence to presume one. 1 9
Nor was it a requirement that twenty years' use would automatically result
in a presumptive deed, but that a jury may infer such if not inconsistent
with the surrounding circumstances of use and the facts presented.2 0
This criterion was elaborated upon in a later decision, as the proper
course of jury instruction would be to advise that a jury was at liberty
to presume that, upon proof of twenty years' use, an easement could be
of lawful origin.2 1 It was not a mandatory determination, but a rule of
thumb that allowed a jury a licence to presume lawful origin that could
not otherwise be proven. Such an approach is consistent with the general
approach to adverse possession that "grants, letters patent, and records may
be presumed from length of time. It was so laid down in Lord Coke's time
[citing Bedle v. Beard (1607), 12 Rep. 4] as undoubted law at that time,
and in modem times has been adopted to its fullest extent." 2 2 However, it
is not the mere passage of time that is relevant, but the active use. This has
been the law of England for many years, that "no rule that has established
that mere length of time will bar," however "every presumption, that can
fairly be made, shall be made against a stale demand." 23 Contemporary
treatises on evidence from the early 19th-century confirm such
understanding, that absent a statutory limitation period, time alone does
not bar a claim, but affords such "practical efficacy" on "considerations
of policy and convenience." 2 4 Such an approach remained controversial at
law, characterized as "a revolting fiction" that required a jury to disregard
its oath and recognize a grant that was understood not to exist in fact, and
a "scandal on the administration of justice." 25
Indeed, in English case law, the approach remained consistent that
the circumstances of the case had to be analyzed before making such a
17. An excellent source for the history of the lost modern grant can be found in Alan Dowling, "The
Doctrine of Lost Modern Grant" (2003) 38:1 Jur 225. The author is indebted to Dr. Dowling's research
in location early cases of point.
18. Livett v Wilson (1825), 3 Bing 115, 130 Eng Rep 457.
19. Ibid at 459.
20. Ibid at 459 per Best CJ.
21. Tenny d Whinnet v Jones (1833), 10 Bing 75, 131 Eng Rep 833.
22. Read v Brookman, 3 TR 158.
23. Pickering v Lord Stamford (1794), 2 Ves Jr 282.
24. Thomas Starkie, A Practical Treatise of the Law of Evidence, Vol II, Part II, 7th American ed
from the 3rd London ed (Philadelphia PA: T & JW Johnson, Law Booksellers, 1842) at 914.
25. Dowling, supra note 17 at 225, citing various 19th-century cases.
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presumption.2 6 When dealing with such claims as prescriptive easements,
the approach has been to look to the circumstances, consider the alleged
use and its duration, and determine if such use gives rise to the resumption.
Forbearance from a demand to cease and desist affords a presumption that
the affected party intended to relinquish it or was satisfied to grant same;
thus the presumption of "lost grant" arises.2 7 Early cases looked not just
to the element of twenty years' use, but as well the "cautious or imprudent
character of the supposed grantor [would] be receivable [in evidence],"
since if a grant is to be presumed, it is not mere length of such use that is
material but the actions surrounding the inference of a grant of right.2 8 A
grant does not rely on use to be valid; rather, it relies on the intention of the
grantor in making same. By extension, the nature of the use that was not
interrupted by the landowner would be evidence of intention. A frequent,
intensive use which continued without interruption would give rise to the
imputation of such intention. A prudent landowner would presumably
take action against regular, frequent, intensive trespass. Although early
cases do not reflect marginal cases of intensive use for periods of less than
twenty years, such an undercurrent can be detected in the early common
law, which treats duration of use as a factor, using the twenty-year mark
as a convenient legal fiction and "line in the sand" for a jury's guidance.
In Newfoundland, such case law and history likely did not escape
notice from those educated in English law, although no citations are made
to the same in the reported cases. In the case of Casey v Hamlin, the
court dealt with an obstruction to a plaintiff's alleged right-of-way across
the defendant's land.2 9 In that case, it was the plaintiff who had pled an
uninterrupted exercise of the right-of-way for twenty years.3 0 It is clear
from reviewing the decision that this was a jury trial and the decision
recounts the instructions to the jury.3 1 If so, this would be consistent with
the English approach to the doctrine of "lost modem grant," although such
is not expressly stated in the decision-understandably so if the decision
reflects a judicial instruction to a jury as finder of fact, which need not be
complicated by the legal principles and doctrines animating the instruction.
The decision merely notes that there was a verdict entered for the plaintiff
and nominal damages awarded. This decision does not reflect an in-depth
analysis of the law underpinning the reasons.
26. Tenny d Winnett v Jones, supra note 21 at 836, per Gaselee J.
27. Pickering v Lord Stamford, supra note 23; Tenny d Whinnett v Jones, supra note 21 at 835.
28. Doe dFenwick v Reed (1821), 5 B & Ald 234, 106 Eng Rep 1177 at 1178.
29. (1859), 4 Nfid LR 285.
30. Ibid at 285.
31. Ibid at 286.
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By the same token, the decision of Kent J. in Murphy v. Murphy3 2
follows both the facts and the approach of the Casey decision. In dealing
with an obstructed right of way, the plaintiff pled use of the right of way
by himself and his predecessors in title for a period of over twenty years;
evidence adduced at trial indicated that the use alleged may have gone on
for some sixty years.3 3 It is noteworthy that there is no discussion of the
law or the particular length of time required to establish a prescriptive
easement in Murphy; rather, the court simply notes that "this passageway
has been used by the plaintiff and his predecessors in title for a period
sufficiently long to entitle him to the right he claims in this action."3 4
Neither Casey nor Murphy expressly hold that the twenty-year period
is determinative in and of itself. Neither was a case on the margins-
both involved acknowledged use for at least twenty years. There is no
indication in Casey that the defendant argued against the period of the
plaintiff's alleged use; rather, the defendant's argument dealt with licence
and permission.3 5 In such circumstances, and quite sensibly, there was no
need to delve into the question of whether a period of less than twenty
years would suffice to vest the plaintiff with a right-of-way; nobody
appears to have asserted that the plaintiff's use was for any shorter period.
For the purposes of charging the jury, application of the standard twenty-
year period would suffice. Similarly, in Murphy (which was not a jury
decision, but a trial by judge), the evidence established use for sixty years
or more; whether or not a period of less than twenty years would suffice
was of no relevance to the court's decision.
There has been some indication in more recent case law that a period
shorter than twenty years may suffice. In Henley, Steele C.J.D.C. endorses
the following excerpt from Halsbury's:
Unexplained user of an easement or other incorporeal right for a period
of twenty years is also held to be presumptive evidence of the existence
of the right from time immemorial; but the rule is not inflexible, the
period of twenty years being only fixed as a convenient guide.36
This passage is relied upon by Steele C.J.D.C. in his determination on the
facts of Henley that a fourteen-year period of usage was insufficient to give
nse to a prescriptive easement.3 7 This decision is reached "notwithstanding
32. (1933), 13 Nfid LR 132 [Murphy].
33. Ibid at 133.
34. Ibid at 135 [emphasis added].
35. Supra note 12 at 285.
36. Henley, supra note 3 at para 48.
37. Ibid at para 49.
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the fact that every presumption is made in favour of long user I am fully
aware that the courts are slow to draw an inference offact which would
defeat a right that has been exercised during a long period."38 To some
degree, Henley should be looked at in its context-Justice Steele makes
reference to "the circumstances of the present case" in finding that a
fourteen year period is insufficient.3 9 However, the circumstances ofHenley
demonstrate good reason for exercising caution in finding a prescriptive
easement on the facts. These include periods of vacancy of the dominant
and servient tenements, successions of owners of the servient tenement
who may have had no knowledge of the plaintiff's purported easement,
lack of evidence of the treatment of the purported easement by previous
owners, and insufficient evidence of the actual duration of the plaintiff's
use of the easement as a user as of right.40 Justice Steele held that while the
maximum period for the plaintiff's claim of use as of right was fourteen
years, "in all probability that period of time may be less.""
What, then, should we make of the conclusions in Henley? It is evident
that Steele C.J.D.C. approached the twenty-year period with an open mind,
but that on the facts before him, the use of the alleged easement was too
sporadic and insufficiently notorious (based on the evidence presented) to
be satisfied with only a fourteen-year period. This is not an endorsement of
an all-or-nothing twenty-year approach, but rather a finding of fact relative
to the specifics of this case. Fourteen years may have been acceptable, had
the use been more intensive and frequent. Since the use as demonstrated
at trial did not rise to a relevant level of intensity, more time would have
been required. While not explicitly stating this, Steele C.J.D.C.'s analysis
and conclusions lead one to conclude that this is the proper approach.4 2
Several years later, the Supreme Court of Newfoundland had the
opportunity to review Henley in Bayside Enterprises Ltd. v. Boulos.43
There, the plaintiff sought an injunction against the defendant regarding the
defendant's use of a roadway. The defendant's use of the subject roadway
as of right for a period of thirteen years was held to be insufficient to give
rise to a prescriptive easement. 4 However, as in Henley, Mahoney J. took
a contextual approach and found that "in the circumstances of the present
case, 13 years is not enough," and went on to note that he was not even
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid at para 51.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid at paras 47-51.
43. (1983), 39 Nfid & PEIR 451, 11 APR 451 (TD).
44. Ibid at paras 26-27.
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satisfied that the defendant had been a user as of right for a thirteen-year
period." This again is a contextual inquiry, determined in large part on the
facts of the easement claimant's use of the property, to determine whether
or not the alleged use rose to a level that could justify a shorter period of
use than twenty years.
Some time later, the Supreme Court of Newfoundland had yet
another opportunity to review the periods of use necessary to give rise
to a prescriptive easement. In Carew v. Rockwood, L.D. Barry J. notes
that "Steele C.J.D.C. left open whether twenty years of use was necessary
at common law or whether it should only be regarded as a convenient
guide."4 6 Justice Barry conducts a contextual analysis of the alleged use
(in that case, a parking easement in a common driveway) to determine
if the use alleged would suffice in the period of time during which it
occurred. However, further along in the decision, Barry J., in obiter, notes
that even if there was such use without permission, such use "would have
been less than 15 years, an insufficient period to establish an easement,"
citing to Henley and Bayside as authority.4 Perhaps this is intended in the
spirit of a contextual analysis, based upon the sporadic and necessarily
temporary use alleged (in this case, parking on a disputed six-foot strip
of common driveway). However, a statement that use for fifteen years is
an insufficient period to establish an easement" indicates that the twenty-
year period may be developing into more of a rule and less of a guideline.
Indeed, as recently as 2011, the Supreme Court continued to hold that
there was no set time period for use to give rise to a prescriptive easement
and that a contextual inquiry relating to use was required to determine an
appropriate period."
However, in 2012, the Court of Appeal's decision in Franklin v. St.
John (City) seems to indicate a move toward a stricter approach, adhering
to the twenty year period of prescription. In Franklin, the court states:
In this province, therefore, the fictional presumption of lost modem grant
has now matured into a clear rule, on analogy with limitations legislation:
that evidence of uninterrupted user, of the nature described in Henley v.
Ryan, for a period of at least twenty years with acquiescence (knowledge
of the user, coupled with the power to stop it or sue in respect of it, and
abstinence from such action or suit) of the owner of the land, will result
in an easement by prescription."
45. Ibid at para 29.
46. (1993), 112 Nfid & PEIR 299 at para 21, 350 APR 299 (TD).
47. Ibid at para 44.
48. Kennedy v Hickey, 2011 NLTD(G) 120, 313 Nfid & PEIR 13 at paras 42-44 (TD).
49. Franklin v St John & (City), supra note 14 at para 35.
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This excerpt from Franklin seems clear: the twenty-year period has
evolved into a "clear rule." In the earlier cases, the twenty-year period
is expressly stated to be a useful guideline, and previous decisions of the
District Court and the Supreme Court left open the question of where
the line would be drawn. However, later in Franklin the court reviews
the claim of another easement claimant, Sonco, whose use continued for
eleven years prior to the commencement of legal proceedings. Citing to
Carew v. Rockwood, which in turn is citing to Henley v. Ryan, the court
seems ready to acknowledge that the twenty-year period is merely a
suggested guideline, before dismissing the claimant's claim of easement
in one sentence: "Clearly, the 11 years of use of the Laneway by Sonco
is not sufficient to establish a prescriptive easement over the whole of
the Laneway."' The citation to the paragraph from Carew is to the fact
that while Steele C.J.D.C. in Henley left open the question of whether
twenty years of use was mandatory, he determined that fourteen years was
not sufficient in that case. However, a principled review of Henley would
indicate that the question is more open than whether a person has made
use of an easement for fourteen years, but rather that on the facts of that
given case, fourteen years of such use as alleged would not give rise to a
presumption of an easement by prescription. Fourteen years is not fixed
as a hard and fast rule in Henley. Rather, it was determined that on the
facts presented, the use as proven in court would not suffice to create a
prescriptive easement after fourteen years of such use. The Carew citation
oversimplifies the Henley discussion and omits the contextual inquiry,
notwithstanding that Barry J. conducts a contextual inquiry as to the nature
of the use in Carew. The Court's statement in Franklin that "[c]learly, the
11 years of use... is not sufficient" seems to rigidly apply the periods of
time in pnior cases without alluding to the nature of use in a comparative
sense. This approach is in line with the court's previous statement some
fifteen paragraphs earlier in Franklin that twenty years is the period of use
required. However, it raises the question, if the twenty-year period is to be
so rigidly applied, why does the Court later return to the Carew statement
in determining whether Sonco's use for eleven years would give rise to a
prescriptive easement? No citation is necessary to determine that eleven
is less than twenty, yet the court takes the additional step to imply that
shorter periods of time may succeed. On this further review, the Court
dismisses Sonco's claim on the basis that a fourteen-year period was found
to be insufficient in Henley. Surely this analysis would be unnecessary
if twenty years was a hard and fast requirement; it would be a complete
50. Ibid at para 50.
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answer to the claim if the number of years of alleged use was under twenty.
Yet the court also dismisses Sonco's claim by indicating that a period of
fourteen years had been found insufficient in Henley, and strictly applies
that guidepost with no comparative discussion of relative use, such as how
Sonco's use for eleven years contrasts with the fourteen years of use in
Henley. In determining whether or not a prescriptive easement exists, are
we to rigidly apply a minimum period of twenty years, as suggested at
paragraph 35, or is some amount greater than fourteen years sufficient,
as suggested by paragraph 50? Is fourteen years even meant to act as a
minimum period, regardless of use alleged? Should any minimum period
apply?
The confusion in these approaches is evident in Labrador Investments
Ltd. v. White Bear Construction Ltd. 1 There, the court had to determine an
easement claim relating to the use of a driveway, which use was alleged
for a period of less than twenty years. Citing to Franklin as authority that
the twenty-year threshold is the measurement point, Stack J. further relies
on Franklin as determining that eleven years is insufficient.5 2 This again
reflects a reliance on fixed timelines as determining claims. However,
Justice Stack notes that the court was not provided with an analysis of the
historical origins of prescriptive easements in this province, or the reasons
for or origins of the twenty-year period. Quite reasonably, he questions the
application of limitations periods to prescriptive claims, but felt bound to
apply the twenty-year period in Franklin notwithstanding his questions on
point. As such analysis was not before the court, Stack J. took the law as he
found it from the higher court and found twenty years to be required and
eleven years' use insufficient.
A principled review of the history and evolution of prescriptive
easements in Newfoundland would suggest that the period of time,
expressed as an absolute period of years, is not determinative-it is and
remains a contextual inquiry based on the nature of use. On a contextual
approach, one could conceive of circumstances where a period less than
twenty years would be appropriate. For instance, in Henley, fourteen years
was insufficient based on the use that was alleged.5 3 Periods of heavy,
regular and frequent use of an alleged easement for a period less than
twenty years would, perhaps, give rise to a claim of "lost modem grant." It
was not necessary to so decide in Henley, Bayside or Carew, because the
51. 2013 NLTD(G) 95, 338 Nfid & PEIR 227 (TD).
52. Ibid at paras 22-26.
53. See Henley, supra note 3 at para 49: "In the circumstances of the present case fourteen years is
simply not long enough"
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use did not rise to such a level on the facts and the court noted in all three
cases that there was some question as to whether or not the claimants could
even demonstrate use for the shorter period as alleged. Yet these decisions
leave the door open that, with the right constellation of facts, a period of
less than twenty years could meet the requirements of demonstrating a lost
modem grant of easement.
II. Limitation legislation
Although it is clear that the Limitations Act" does not apply to
incorporeal hereditaments," it may be useful to consider its application
to the theoretical principle of a lost grant. If the root of a prescriptive
easement is in the legal fiction of a "lost modem grant," then one must
consider the (fictional) contractual basis by which it is deemed to exist.
The presumption at law is a grant made in fee simple.56 Furthermore, at
least one Newfoundland decision has employed the relevant limitations
legislation to the determination of whether or not a prescniptive easement
is available. In Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Young," Puddester J. had to decide
whether or not a prescriptive easement for the parking of vehicles arose
between termination of a lease in 1985 and the request for parking activity
to cease in 1994. In determining that twenty years was the appropriate
period of time to apply, Justice Puddester points to the twenty-year
limitation period in the Limitation of Realty Actions Act" as the relevant
source of the "maximum statutory time period in which the true owner of
land may bring action to recover possession from an occupant or user."5 9
Pursuant to the limitations legislation in effect at the time, "[a] person
shall make an entry or distress or bring an action to recover land or rent,
within twenty years after the time at which the right to make the entry or
distress, or to bring the action, first arose to a person through whom he or
she claims."60
While from the perspective of the dominant tenement, limitations
legislation of Newfoundland does not apply to set a timeline for creation
of an incorporeal hereditament, under the rationale in Imperial Oil, one
must question if the present Limitations Act applies in a form of estoppel
to bar a landowner from attempting to recover property from a prescriptive
easement. If the decision in Imperial Oil is correct, and the root of the
54. SNL 1995, c L-16.1.
55. Abbott v Delaney (1987), 64 Nfid & PEIR at para 37, 197 APR 121 (TD).
56. Carew v Rockwood, supra note 46 at para 21; Henley, supra note 3 at 438.
57. [1996] NJ No 217, 142 Nfid & PEIR 280 (TD) [Imperial Oil].
58. RSNL 1990, c L-16.
59. Supra note 57 at para 53.
60. RSNL 1990, c L-16, s 3(1). This section is unchanged from RSN 1970, c 207.
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twenty-year rule is in limitations legislation on land interests, then as of
1995, the period for establishment of a prescriptive easement would be
ten years.61 Given the later decisions of the courts subsequent to Imperial
Oil, it is clear that this cannot be correct. However, if the presumption
at law is a lost modem grant, why would we not apply the limitation
period for recovery of land as with any other grant or conveyance? The
answer is twofold: firstly, as noted previously, limitations legislation in
this province applies only to corporeal herediatments (i.e. ownership
interests), rather than incorporeal hereditaments.6 2 Secondly, the language
ofNewfoundland's current limitations legislation bars an action "to recover
land" after ten years.6 3 While not considered in Newfoundland case law,
the Ontario Court of Appeal recently considered the meaning of "recover"
in the property law context in McConnell v. Huxtable.64 On review of the
Ontario decision, the concept of recovery of land is inexorably linked to
the concept of ownership of land. Since an easement does not bestow an
ownership interest, and the servient tenement remains the property of its
original owner, there is no land for the owner of the servient tenement to
recover. There has been no change of possession that requires an action
for recovery.
Conclusion
As can be seen on a review of first principles and the evolution of the
common law, the proper approach to determination of the existence of a
prescriptive easement in Newfoundland is entirely contextual. This depends
on both (1) the nature and extent of the use alleged and (2) the length of
such use. While jurisprudence has moved toward a firm application of
fixed periods of use, this has not stopped applicants from coming forward
to claim prescriptive easements alleged to have arisen in shorter periods
of time. Courts and practitioners should not feel bound by the twenty-year
rule for establishing prescriptive easements, and greater reliance should
be placed on analysis of the particular use alleged in a given case. Rather
than treating the length of use as an absolute rule, more strenuous, regular,
61. Limitations Act, supra note 54, s 7(1)(g). Note that this section is far more simplified than its
predecessor and refers only to an action "to recover land."
62. Abbott, supra note 55 at para 37; note that this decision referred to the Limitation ofRealty
ActionsActof 1970, whichwas substantially the same legislationas included inthe 1990 consolidation
which was before the court in Imperial Oil. See also Hugh W Simmons Ltd v Foster, [1954] 3 DLR
524 at para 8, 32 MPR 243 (Nfid SC en banc), where Walsh CJN notes the inapplicability of the then-
current Statute ofLimitations on an easement claim over water, in part due to the fact that the claim
was not for "land or any corporeal interest in land."
63. Limitations Act, supra note 54, s 7(1)(g).
64. 2014 ONCA86 atparas 17-23, [2014] OJNo 477.
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frequent and evident use should be considered as requiring a shorter length
of use than more transitory, infrequent and irregular use. It is hoped that
courts going forward will take a more individualized approach to the
analysis of use in prescriptive claims and consider shorter periods of use
as giving rise to prescriptive easements in cases of clear and intensive use.
